In the last ten years, the intersection of conspiracy theories with American political rhetoric has become alarmingly common.  Many of the more extreme currents in contemporary political discourse have originated from the political right, specifically from the Tea Party and President Trump.  During the Tea Party’s heyday in 2009-2011, political rhetoric on the right took on an increasingly conspiratorial tone. Driven by Fox News and talk radio hosts such Glen Beck and Alex Jones, Republicans increasingly adopted birtherism, claimed that President Obama was a Muslim, and indulged a variety of other fringe beliefs.  In 2010, then Alabama Supreme Court Judge Roy Moore warned that President Obama would seek to install “a UN guard in every house”; right wing media figures obsessed over the President’s supposed radical influences (Jeremiah Wright and Bill Ayers), even claiming that his election was part of a vast plot to destroy America (a theme infamously repeated by Sen. Marco Rubio during the 2016 Republican primary debates). 

This paranoia in right-wing discourse has been carried on by Donald Trump and his movement.  From reveling in “Deep State” conspiracy theories to explain his indictment, to retweeting 9/11 conspiracy theorists, the 45th President has openly embraced the far right’s most extreme elements.  

In an age where the internet has amplified the conspiratorial rhetoric of extremists, it is the duty of responsible figures on the Right to eschew this phenomenon. But given the impact of Donald Trump’s rhetorical style on the Republican Party, this particular rhetorical style seems likely to remain a major influence on conservative discourse for the foreseeable future.

To students of American history, this disturbing pattern may seem oddly familiar.  The accusations of spying and alleged Muslim Brotherhood ties against Hillary Clinton’s former aid Huma Abedin bring to mind Joseph McCarthy’s crusade against “Communists” in the State Department, while Donald Trump’s infamous 2016 ad juxtaposing “real Americans” with Jewish financiers recalls the anti-Semitic rhetoric and conspiratorial rants against “big banks” that characterized the Populist movement of the 1890’s.  What connects contemporary far-right patterns of rhetoric with these eerily similar historical examples? 

The answer may be found in the writings of the prominent mid-twentieth century historian Richard Hofstader.  In his classic 1965 book, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, Hofstader identified a common strain of rhetoric drawn upon by diverse movements ranging from nineteenth century Populism to Fundamentalist reactionaries in the 1920’s to extremist anti-New Deal organizations such as the Liberty League in the 1930’s to the John Birch society and other right wing conspiracy theorists in the 1950’s.  Hofstadter argued these diverse political movements were united by their common embrace of a “Paranoid Style” in American politics—a conspiratorial appeal to the id of the American mind. Frequent targets of this “paranoid style” included large financial institutions, religions such as Catholicism and Judaism, intellectual elites, and organizations perceived as secretive or un-American—Hofstader cites the Masons and Jesuits as examples.  While previous historians tended to analyze phenomena such as anti-Catholicism or suspicion of big banks as individual characteristics of specific political movements, Hofstader argued that these historical instances were all examples of a common style of paranoid rhetoric tapped into by a variety of political movements throughout American history.  

Hofstadter identifies several characteristics of the Paranoid Style.  Most important was a belief in the existence of a vast, usually internal, conspiracy to subvert the American government.  “It is a notorious fact that the Monarchs of Europe and the Pope of Rome are at this very moment plotting our destruction and threatening the extinction of our political, civil, and religious institutions” ranted a Texas newspaper editor in 1855. In the 1890’s, Populist writers like S.EV. Emery alleged a vast conspiracy of bankers to oppress the farmers of rural America; and in the 1950’s, John Birch Society founder Robert Welch accused President Eisenhower of being a “dedicated, conscious agent of the Communist Conspiracy”.  Often, such claims were situated within apocalyptic rhetoric portraying America as being in the midst of a vast battle between good and evil.  Today, the belief in a grand conspiracy to undermine the United States has been a common staple point of the right wing blogosphere and talk radio—for instance, Glen Beck’s “Agenda 21” conspiracy about the UN.  

Another key characteristic of Paranoid Style is the creation of false narratives about those who defect from certain movements or ideologies. Anti-Catholic polemics in the early nineteenth century often cited The Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk, a “memoir” purportedly written by a former nun claiming to describe her witness of sexual slavery, the murder of infants, and other horrific crimes within a Catholic convent.  The Anti-Masonic Party in the 1830’s similarly relied on the accounts of alleged former Masons to support their claims of a vast Masonic conspiracy to dominate the United States. “Anti-Catholicism used the runaway nun and the apostate priest; the place of ex-Communists in the avant-garde anti-Communist movements of our time is well known,” notes Hofstader in his book’s most notable essay.  This aspect of the Paranoid Style would go on to be mirrored by later political movements.  The revered status of the writings of former Communists such as Louis F. Budenz and Elizabeth Bentley among far right anti-Communist movemens of the 1950’s strikingly mirrors the the obsession of contemporary right wing Islamaphobes with supposed defectors from Islamist extremism, such as Walid Shoebat and Sharam Hadian.  The influence of the Paranoid Style is also evident in the right wing obsession of many conspiracy theorists with “defectors” from the “other side”; Q Anon, a popular conspiracy theory in the Trump movement linked to “Pizzagate”, is based on the notion that individuals are falsely claiming to be high ranking officials in the US government.  The anti-Catholicism frequently targeted by early utilizers of the Paranoid style is also reminiscent of contemporary right’s cottage industry of Islamophobia.  Popular conspiracy theorists like Frank Gaffney and Pamela Geller have stirred controversy over issues such as the Ground Zero Mosque by claiming the existence of Islamic plots to subvert US—often fixating on alleged efforts to impose Sharia law on the American legal system, or claiming infiltration of the US government by organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (see for instance the efforts the efforts to smear Hillary Clinton’s aide Huma Abedin as a spy). 

A third characteristic was an obsession with the supposed moral depravity of the enemy.  Nineteenth century anti-Catholic literature fixated on the supposed licentiousness of priests and nuns; anti-Catholicism, observes Hofstader, “has always been the pornography of the Puritan”.  Similarly, the Anti-Masons displayed a disturbing fascination with the supposed gruesome fates meted out to traitorous members of the Lodge.  Today, this trope is echoed in the rhetoric of far right anti-Muslim populists in who exaggerate reports of sexual assault committed by migrants in Europe—a claim made by Donald Trump, among others.  The “Pizzagate” conspiracy theory, which claims the existence of a pedophile ring linked to Hillary Clinton and other Democratic Party figures—is also illustrative of the Paranoid Style’s fascination with the enemy’s sexual deviancy.

Today’s right must reject the Paranoid Style.  This does not simply mean condemning “fake news” and other outright false beliefs.  It means shunning the Paranoid Style’s rhetorical devices—subtle hints at shadowy conspiracies of elites; vague accusations of treason from within; apocalyptic rhetoric pitting “real Americans” against vast international plots.  Only then can the Paranoid Style be eradicated from American political rhetoric.